






In Defence of Integrative Violence
How Can Philosophical Practice Augment Organic Social Control
Abstract
The paper explores the relationship between organic and institutional forms of social con-
trol from a potential contribution by philosophical practice to understanding social sancti-
ons. The argumentation begins from the point of empirical fact that laws and constitutions 
of various countries define the purpose of punishment in a utilitarian light in their pream-
bles. This operational-utilitarian character of institutional social control is similar to the 
utilitarian nature of philosophical consulting as practice. When control, which presupposes 
a form of violence, is viewed in a broader understanding of the notion of violence, space 
opens for a discussion on a challenging and controversial question about whether or not 
can violence be integrative either in the sense of integrating values or in the sense of con-
firming someone’s social status after a transgression, and to what a larger degree than by 
institutionalised and from an individual conceptually relatively distant forms of sanction.
Keywords
organicism,	 institutional	 penalties,	 social	 control,	 philosophical	 counselling,	 integrative	
practices
Introduction
The aims of philosophical practice are generally utilitarian. The main differ-
ence between philosophical practice and theoretical philosophy lies in their 
objectives.	This	difference,	naturally,	has	major	repercussions	for	their	meth-
odology.	While	 theoretical	philosophy	focuses	on	 interpretation,	and	at	 the	
same time steers clear of placing itself directly in the service of any practi-
cal,	instrumental	goals,	philosophical	practice	is	an	applied	philosophy	in	the	
sense that it uses philosophical knowledge and insights in the service of vari-
ous	independently	established	goals,	such	as	personal	well-being	or	corporate	
or social prosperity. This instrumental nature of philosophical practice makes 
it inherently utilitarian. 















augment penal and general social control policy both in policy design and in 
policy implementation.
I	conclude	by	expanding	on	 the	general	psychotherapeutic	 ramifications	 of	
social	 control	 as	 a	 form	 of	 socialisation	 that	 defines	 our	 understanding	 of	
psychological  normalcy and introduces integrative psychotherapy based on 




Utilitarianism as a View of Penal Policy
What distinguishes utilitarian theories from retributive ones is that the latter 




penal	policy	 is	only	 the	 ‘prospective’	 relationship	between	 the	penalty	and	
its expected consequences. Utilitarianism is not based on a commensurabil-






this	efficiency	is	increasingly	seen	solely in terms of crime prevention. Such 
a	view	has	significant	consequences	for	certain	moral	principles,	customarily	
taken	to	be	the	backbone	of	any	acceptable	system	of	criminal	justice.1
Any system of penal policy makes a crucial reference to rules as a normative 
foundation	for	the	specific	implementation	of	policy.	The	significance	of	rules	
in light of the overall utilitarian framework of operation of social control and 
penal	policy	as	one	of	its	prominent	forms	can	hardly	be	overestimated,	as	the	
normative interpretation of rules casts a light on the very model of utilitarian 
reasoning	applied	in	any	specific	policy.	At	the	same	time,	the	understanding	
of  legal  rules  that  establish  grounds  for  meting  out  penalties  sharpens  the  





to their role as merely facilitating predictable relationships between the mem-
bers	of	a	community).	Retributivists	and	utilitarians	generally	agree	on	 the	
authority-giving	nature	of	rules.	Their	views	differ	substantially,	however,	on	



















particular rule is. She does not distinguish between the aim of a penalty and 
the	ground	for	its	moral	justification.	As	a	consequentialist,	she	considers	an	
action	 to	be	 justified	 if:	 (i)	 the	achievement	of	 its	aim	would	 increase	 ‘the	
cumulative	welfare’	 for	 all	 or	most	 stakeholders,	 (ii)	 the	way	 the	 action	 is	
proposed	seems	reasonable	 in	view	of	actually	achieving	 the	aim,	and	(iii)	
the	 cost	 inculcated	 by	 the	 proposed	 strategy	would	 not	 exceed	 the	 benefit	
from	the	action	or	policy.	Hence,	the	utilitarian	understands	rules	merely	as	
directions	 for	generally	beneficial	 strategies.	Consequently,	 if	 a	 rule	could,	
under	 certain	 circumstances,	 be	 reasonably	 considered	 harmful	 or	 insuffi-
ciently	beneficial	vis-à-vis	the	costs	of	the	strategy,	then,	by	utilitarian	lights,	
it should be broken.
This simple version of utilitarianism is an easy victim to malevolent critique. 
In	fact,	considerations	of	benefits	arising	from	control	policy	usually	go	con-
siderably beyond individual cases and assume that a degree of orderliness and 
predictability in meting out criminal sanctions is a prerequisite for an effec-










and thus the law ought to be obeyed even in those instances where it would be 
more	efficient	to	break	it	(Austin,	1995).
Act-utilitarianism clearly presents enormous problems for legal theory. The 
rules relevant to penal policy are laws. An act-utilitarian would consider any 
instance	of	an	implementation	of	law	in	light	of	its	specific	benefits	and	costs	
and  would  thus  be  open  to  breaking  the  law in  principle.  A rule-utilitarian  
would	consider	the	law	generally	beneficial	in	an	overall	perspective	and	fur-
ther	the	obedience	of	laws	regardless	of	the	cost-benefit	calculations	in	specif-
1   
These lines suggest that the factual workings 
of	 existing	 systems	 of	 criminal	 justice	 are	
utilitarian  because  they  all  function  almost  
exclusively  in  the  service  of  preventative  
aims.	Indeed,	this	applies	to	all	public	policy,	
not	just	to	that	of	criminal	justice.	Bob	Goo-
din has also argued that indeed utilitarianism 
is	inherent	in	any	public	policy,	but	that	there	 
 
is a way of making this plausible from a more 
comprehensive	moral	point	of	view:	Goodin,	
1995;	Fatić,	1995).
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They do take them seriously if	they	find	them	





ic cases. This would mean that a rule-utilitarian would be open to embracing 
a	value	ethics,	albeit	with	a	utilitarian	justification:	embracing	certain	values,	
including	 that	 of	 justice,	 is	 likely	 beneficial	 for	 the	 society;	 the	 legal	 sys-
tem	should	thus	be	just;	it	should	mete	out	punishments	according	to	deserts.	
While a retributivist will argue that people should receive what they deserve 
because	 that	 is	 required	by	 their	 human	dignity	 (the	Kantian	 explanation),	
or	because	the	criminals’	victims	or	society	in	general	deserve	satisfaction,	
the rule-utilitarian may argue for the same policy of giving people their dues 
through	 penal	 policy,	 though	 on	 completely	 different	 conceptual	 grounds,	
namely because that is what pays off in the medium to long run.3
Improvement	on	the	Utilitarian	Theme:	 
Anti-Professionalism	and	Conflict-Resolution
Tapping the widespread disenchantment with the monopoly of the profession-
als,	such	as	lawyers,	the	police,	magistrates	and	judges,	prison	administration,	
etc.,	 in	 the	 area	 of	 criminal	 justice,	Norwegian	 criminologist	Nils	Christie	
proposed  a  radical  anti-professionalist  philosophy  of  social  control  in  his  
1981 book Limits to pain	(Christie,	1981).	Christie	advocated	the	main	princi-
ples	of	what	would	soon	become	the	famous	“conflict-resolution”	movement	
in	criminal	justice,	seeking	to	override	the	traditional	norms	of	social	control	
and introduce more conciliatory and far-reaching strategies than the tradition-
al penalty-oriented approach.
The	first	 and	main	 principle	 of	 conflict-relation	 is,	 as	Christie	 proposes	 it,	
that	 the	 application	of	 punishment	 as	 deliberate	 infliction	 of	 pain	ought	 to	
be	avoided	whenever	possible.	Only	in	exceptional,	extremely	serious	cases	
should	offenders	be	penalised.	In	most	other,	more	“normal”	cases,	offenders	







inal disputers are absent.
Forms	of	compensation	exist	in	most	criminal	justice	systems.	Measures	of	
community	service	are	well-known,	as	are	parole-type	sentences	and	other	
measures designed to mitigate the aggression and confrontation inherent in 
any	 penalisation.	 Yet,	 where	 “conflict-resolution”	 is	 in	 principle	 different	
from	existing	criminal	justice	systems	is	in	placing	a	far	greater	emphasis	on	
the	non-punitive	measures,	while	most	existing	systems	are	based on the idea 
of	penalties	 in	 current	 criminal	 justice	 systems;	non-punitive	measures	 are	
more of an exception.
The	most	obvious	 shortcomings	of	 “compensatory	 justice”	as	proposed	by	
Christie,	and	at	the	same	time	the	crucial	differences	between	criminal	and	
tort	cases,	stem	from	the	strong	affective	reactions	 to	more	serious	crimes.	
There	 is	 a	 very	 simple	 relationship	of	 proportionality	 here:	 the	greater	 the	
amount	of	antagonisation	produced	by	 the	crime,	 the	 lower	 the	probability	
that	compensatory	justice	will	take	place,	and	the	greater	the	chance	of	vio-












highly economically and democratically advanced countries today use corpo-
ral punishments as less harsh forms of punishment than the institutional pol-
icies	of	penalisation	and	imprisonment,	e.g.	Singapore),	if	they	are	inflicted	
directly	by	those	members	of	the	community	who	are	harmed	by	the	offence,	





many	cases,	 those	directly	victimised	by	 the	offence	chose	 to	 refrain	 from	
hurting the offender entirely. The experience offered a degree of catharsis and 
direct contact between the offenders and the direct or indirect victims of the 
offence,	allowing	a	resumption	of	relations	after	the	incident.	





ed has gone down dramatically. That was good for the second sector represented by industry. 
That	 sector	 got	more	 competing	 empty	hands,	 until	 their	 level	 of	mechanisation	 reached	 an	
unbelievably	high	level,	and	their	need	for	workers	also	diminished.	Again	good	for	the third 




huge service sector to be paid for by the diminishing returns from our national industrial system. 
At	this	stage,	most	highly	industrial	countries	have	chosen	the	same	instinctive	reaction;	they	
stop the growth of the service sector. Those countries worst off start to diminish that sector also. 
The	post-industrial	society	is	there.”	(Christie,	1981,	p.	6)
This,	of	course,	has	a	wide	range	of	implication;	according	to	Christie,	those	
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The reader must be warned that this is only a 
very general discussion of traditional forms of 
utilitarianism	indeed.	In	no	case	is	this	a	suffi-
cient analysis for the appraisal of all forms of 
 
utilitarianism. More details on the philosophi-




































ed policy aimed at reducing the stress of institutional resolution of disputes 
in	favour	of	a	more	organic	approach	to	human	conflict.	However,	this	fact	
brings us closer to the role philosophical  practice may play in advancing a 
more plausible return to the organic community in penal policy by bringing 
together the fundamental  ideas of  Christie  and many proponents of  the an-
ti-punishment	view,	including	the	advocates	of	ADR.	Clearly,	life	has	shown	



















Socialisation, Normalcy and Violence
As	has	been	mentioned	several	times	in	passing	so	far,	one	particularly	useful	
way of portraying normalcy in psychotherapeutic tradition is as a standard of 
socialisation. The ideals of normalcy in most societies conform to the ideals 
of character traits and general features of ideal members of the community. 
Such	qualities	typically	include	responsibility,	sensitivity	to	general	interest,	
willingness	 to	 self-sacrifice,	 resilience,	 creativity,	 empathy,	 etc.	Most	 such	
attributes get included in the various diagnostic criteria for mental health or 
mental illness. It is the process of socialisation that is primarily responsible 
for	how	‘normal’	we	become	later	in	life;	consequently,	the	structure	of	so-
cialisation accounts for the need for various structural interventions in cases 
of	neurosis	or	psychosis,	intended	to	address	the	problems	that	had	originated	
during early socialisation. 
According	 to	 Lacan	 and	 the	modern	 Lacanians,	 the	 primary signifier  (the  






Consequently,	 the	 interventions	 appropriate	 to	 neurosis	 require	 addressing	
jouissance	(drive	of	satisfaction	or	dissatisfaction,	pleasure	or	displeasure	as-
sociated	with	life’s	experiences	and	one’s	choices)	“at	the	level	of	the	real”,	
meaning dealing with the motivation associated with a sense of pleasure with 




experience of the Real (helping the person develop an understanding of their 
experiences  which  is  both  bearable  and  potentially  productive  for  dealing  
with	life’s	difficulties).	How	the	Symbolic	is	repaired	in	the	psychoanalytic	
treatment of psychosis is complex and falls beside the scope of my present 
discussion:	what	I	want	to	take	away	from	the	Lacanians	here	is	the	idea	that	
normalcy is associated with socialisation alone.4
The insight that normalcy is the result of socialisation is immensely impor-
















enacted across the western world actually prohibit the corporal punishment 
of	children	and	call	it	“violence”,	the	proverbial	smacking	of	a	child	to	dis-
courage her from touching a hot oven or crossing a street alone has been part 




























To illustrate a case for corporal punishment as an instrument of resocialisation 
and/or	moral	education,	I	relate	to	a	recent	true	story	about	abuses	by	social	
workers and social service leaders in Serbia.
Organised	Crime	in	the	Social	Services	of	Serbia:	 
Can Organic Penalties Address Organised Crime  
against the Vulnerable?










Those who are considered to represent  an affront  to the dearest  values and 
existential interest of the Jewish people or to their very identity could be sub-
jected	to	Herem.	They	could	be	killed,	and	the	Old	Testament	uses	the	word	
destroyed	 in	 the	same	way	as	we	speak	 today	of	“destroying	pests”.	There	
is	 intense	community	hatred	 involved	 in	Herem:	but	 it	 is	a	hatred	of	 those	
who,	by	 their	actions	or	way	of	 life,	 threaten	 the	fundamental	sense	of	de-
cency,	religion,	or	the	highest	values	of	the	Jewish	people.	In	later	practice,	
Herem took the  form of  religious  excommunication  and was  perhaps  most  
infamously	 passed	 in	 1656	 by	 the	 Sephardic	 synagogue	 in	Amsterdam	 on	
Baruch Spinosa.
Herem	is	an	essential	ingredient	of	an	organic	understanding	of	social	control:	
especially	 in	 its	original	 form,	 it	 is	 the	 same	moral	 intuition	 that,	 in	a	 less	
drastic	form,	has	led	some	modern	countries,	such	as	Singapore,	to	institute	
public lashing for certain offences that are a particularly obvious affront to 
public decency.
In	modern	western	democracies,	there	is	hardly	a	greater	affront	to	basic	de-
cency as abuses of public authority to trade in children or poison and abuse 
the	elderly.	This	has	happened	within	Serbia’s	social	services,	and	this	case	
illustrates an argument for a modern version of organic Herem in the form of 
immediate corporal punishments.
In	June	2020,	 the	UNESCO	Chair	 for	Bioethics	 for	Europe	publicly	asked	
the Serbian President to urgently initiate new legislation to reduce the legal 
role  of  social  services  and  recommend  the  Serbian  government  to  order  a  
systematic	police	 investigation	of	 social	 services	 (Beta	&	N1,	2020a).	The	
UNESCO	Chair	suggested	that	files	should	be	seized	and	social	workers	de-
tained wherever there are indications of child trade or other types of organised 
crime	(Beta	&	Global	Media	Planet,	2020).	The	 information	 the	UNESCO	
Chair  had received indicated corruption by social  services in child custody 
cases,	 abuse	 and	neglect	 of	 the	 children	 entrusted	 to	 them,	 serious	official	
misconduct,	and	falsification	of	data	about	Coronavirus	cases	in	institutions	






Are these not cases for Herem?
To	 make	 things	 worse,	 the	 relevant	 government	 department,	 which	 is	 in	
charge	of	oversight	 of	 social	 services,	 had	 issued	 a	directive	 to	 social	 ser-
vices to seize all children from parents if children were found to be working. 
The	Ombudsman	then	instructed	the	Ministry	to	revoke	that	instruction	and	
instead  instruct  the  social  services  to  help  the  low-income  families  whose  










Institutional  penalties  would  require  years  to  be  implemented.  During  this  






health. A prison sentence as the outcome would make all  these unwelcome 
consequences	much	worse.	After	the	sentence	is	served,	the	“convicts”	would	
face a whole new set of personal and social issues in their reintegration into 
the community.
Herem,	 as	 a	moral	 intuition,	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 dysfunctional	 so-
cial	and	political	systems,	where	the	system	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	quickly	
mete  out  institutional  punishments  to  the  transgressors  of  key  social  rules  
and	values,	or	relatedly,	in	systemically	corrupt	institutional	structures.	The	
described	system	of	social	services	belongs	 to	 the	 latter	category,	being	so	








The intuition behind Herem articulates public anger at the violation of com-
munal	values	and,	 fundamentally,	stands	behind	any	political	 revolution.	 It	
is an essentially integrative intuition and practice that rallies the community 
behind	a	collective	response	to	insult	and	offence,	thus	reaffirming	its	identity	
and providing its individual members with guidance on what is important in 
society.





Why Integrative Violence is Psychotherapeutic
Closely related to the concept of integrative resocialisation through the use of 
integrative violence is the concept of integrative psychotherapy. This is a form 
of	psychotherapy	that	focuses	on	values	and	community	bonds,	as	well	as	the	
integration of cognitive and emotional identity perceived as a composite re-
sult of socialisation. Such a composite process integrates a human personal-
ity	around	communal	values;	thus	psychodiagnostic’s	inevitable	tendency	to	
focus on the features and character traits of ideal communal membership as 
ideals	of	“mental	health”.	In	integrative	psychotherapy,	personal	authenticity	
is merely a personal style of following values that are fundamentally shared 
with	the	other	members	of	a	community	(cf.	Fatić,	2020a).
Everything	we	achieve	in	our	personal	growth	is	a	part	of	socialisation,	in-
cluding the development of awareness of our personal authenticity. Psycho-




are	built	 into	all	 interpersonal	aspects	of	our	 lives.	Thus,	 there	 is	reason	to	
consider	social	control	to	be	subject	to	the	same	principles	of	psychotherapy,	
to the extent that psychotherapeutic values and principles derive from those 





wards	more	 productive	 and	 happier	 perspectives,	 using	 a	 variety	 of	 philo-
sophical  and  traditional  psychotherapeutic  methods  and  concepts.  It  is  the  
same type of  loving violence that  we exert  on those we love when we ask 
them to change so that our relationships might become sustainable. It is the 
same kind  of  loving  violence  that  we  exert  on  our  children  when we push  
them	to	develop	new	behaviour	patterns	and	change	to	meet	life’s	challenges.	
The	 results	of	 this	 loving	violence	come	 to	one	composite	outcome:	better	
integration  of  personal  identity  based  on  tighter  and  healthier  socialisation  




ty.  While corporal punishments such as public lashings in Singapore might 
seem	harsh,	in	fact,	they	are	highly	benevolent	and	highly	integrative.	In	the	
described	example,	with	systemically	criminalised	social	services,	the	public	
lashing of those caught red-handed neglecting children or abusing the elder-
ly,	or	even	trading	in	children	during	child	custody	trials,	could	be	seen	as	
very lenient  given the gravity of  the offences.  Such punishments  would be 
benevolent	yet	clear	expressions	of	 the	community’s	Herem	with	regard	 to	





ments that would otherwise be incurred by society.
Our	view	of	violence	has	changed	over	the	years;	one	could	probably	claim	
that  a  categorical  prohibition or  stigmatisation of  violence has become one 
of	the	most	structurally	violent	forms	of	culture;	however,	violence	remains	
an	 integral	part	of	organic	human	 relationships,	and	 like	any	other	 type	of	
relationship,	 it	 can	 be	 benevolent	 or	malevolent,	 lenient	 or	 harsh,	 justified	
or	unjustified.	Not	every	violence	is	unjustified,	even	in	informal	communal	
relationships;	in	fact,	many	types	of	violence	are	necessary	and	constructive.	




tion. From the point of view of socialisation as the ultimate criterion of ‘nor-
malcy’	 and	 integrative	psychotherapy’s	view	of	 the	 role	of	 the	 community	
and	commonality	in	mental	and	social	well-being,	considered	and	carefully	
5   
One	might	choose	another	relevant	communi-
ty	compared	to	someone	else,	especially	when	
value-communities	are	at	 stake,	but	 this	 is	 a	 
 
different and more advanced topic in integra-






welcome potential change in the current institutional and highly punitive pol-
icies of social control.
Delimiting the Concept of Herem in the Modern Context
In	the	contemporary	culture	of	institutionalism,	discussions	of	Herem,	other	




to articulate and adequately implement the expressive function of punishment 
for	transgressions	that	fly	 in	the	face	of	the	community’s	most	fundamental	
moral	norms.	Such	is	the	situation	with	the	modern	judicial	system.




must be meted out quickly and whose severity ideally should be in clear pro-
portion	to	the	heinousness	of	the	crime,	in	modern	judicial	systems	this	never	
happens.	One	of	the	reasons	is	the	protracted	legal	procedure	and	the	numer-




tion of the penalties even more farfetched.
Possibilities	for	corruption	in	modern	institutional	systems	are	enormous,	and	
specifically	 for	corruption	that	cannot	be	institutionally	detected	or	proven.	
A	good	example	 is	 the	work	of	prosecution.	 In	most	democratic	countries,	
prosecutors operate with a high degree of discretion.  They are the ultimate 
judges	of	what	actions	they	will	qualify	as	crimes	and	whether	and	to	what	
extent they will prosecute those crimes. There are policies in most countries 
to reduce the caseload by plea-bargaining or by offering the perpetrators the 
so-called	“opportunity	agreements”,	a	way	out	of	criminal	prosecution	in	ex-
change	for	money	being	paid	to	the	state	budget.	From	a	moral	point	of	view,	
and	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 traditional	 legal	 theory,	 this	 is	 open	 and	 direct	








a legitimate reason to consider whether and under what circumstances these 
same prosecutors may decide not to prosecute other crimes simply because 
that allows them to have a lower caseload.
In	late	2020,	Head	of	the	Higher	Court	in	Belgrade,	Judge	Aleksandar	Stepano-
vić,	gained	some	notoriety	in	the	Serbian	media	by	revealing	that	in	his	court,	







policy is to throw out criminal complaints. This created a scandal because it 
became	clear	that	the	Deputy	Prosecutors	in	the	Special	Prosecutor’s	Office,	
who	are	paid	 twice	 the	salary	of	an	ordinary	prosecutor	of	 their	 rank,	pre-




even	 less	 repressive	 control,	 from	 actually	 selling	 their	 decisions	 to	 throw	






is  a  tiny  step  from  that  to  the  prosecutors  actually  engaging  in  individual  





deep-seated.	 In	 some	 situations	 of	 institutional	 regulation,	 the	 very	 practi-
calities  of  institutional  action  are  such  that  they  invite  moral  compromises  
and	even	open	corruption,	such	as	in	plea-bargaining,	and	much	more	so	in	
applying prosecutorial opportunity. These are practices that are prevalent in 
all	democratic	countries,	 including	those	with	 the	strongest	 judicial	 institu-
tions,	and	everywhere	they	have	the	same	ring	of	institutionalised	corruption	
of	selling	the	forgiveness	of	sin,	or	in	the	secular	sense	selling	the	turning	of	
a blind eye to crime.
What  happens when the transgressions of  moral  intuitions of  a  community 
accumulate  to  a  degree  which  is  intolerable  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  
community’s	identity	and	values,	and	legal	proceduralism	is	such	that	sanc-
tioning such transgressions with an appropriate degree of expressive clarity is 
literally	impossible,	such	as	in	the	described	case	with	the	trade	in	children	in	
Serbia and some other countries? What happens when those charged with pro-
tecting	the	vulnerable	become	the	most	heinous	criminals,	en masse,	and	the	
“system”,	or	the	institutions,	have	developed	operational	inertia	simply	not	to	
act in such cases? This generates a morally intolerable situation that requires 
violent action. This is the context for Herem. That is why violence must not 
be	proscribed	categorically,	and	non-institutional,	non-legal	extreme	violence	




There are cases where it is not only acceptable but morally necessary.











for	 the	benefit	 of	 a	moral	 order?	Specifically,	 can	 there	 exist	 a	 categorical	
moral	duty	to	illegally	kill	a	person	who	exemplifies	 and	perpetuates	those	
offences	 to	a	collective’s	moral	self	 to	such	an	extent	 that	allowing	such	a	









Could it be that these old themes are merely echoes of the principled question 
proposed	for	further	research,	more	precisely,	the	question	of	whether,	deonti-
cally,	a	duty	could	be	established,	with	full	philosophical	and	logical	rigour,	to	
illegally kill along the lines of Herem? Perhaps that is the fundamental practi-
cal	philosophical	concept	that	extrapolates	the	extremes	of	my	argument	here,	
where my present argument falls  short  of addressing this provocative topic 
fully,	but	points	to	its	inevitability	in	future	research,	all	in	the	context	of	truly	
organic	social	control.	In	other	words,	can	we	really	conceive	of	organicism	
in social control apart from a broader organicism of social organisation and a 
consensus to protect fundamental morality that means out identity? And how 
far	are	we	entitled,	or	have	a	moral	duty,	to	go	in	pursuing	that	protection	of	
fundamental moral intuitions that make us who we are?
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U obranu integrativnog nasilja
Kako	filozofijska	praksa	može	povećati	organsku	društvenu	kontrolu
Sažetak
Rad se bavi odnosom između organskih i institucionalnih oblika društvene kontrole s točke 
gledišta mogućeg doprinosa filozofijske prakse razumjevanju društvenih sankcija. Argumentacija 
polazi od empirijske činjenice da zakoni i ustavi različitih zemalja, u svojim preambulama, 
najčešće definiraju svrhu kažnjavanja u utilitarističkom svjetlu. Ovaj operativno-utilitarni 
karakter institucionalne društvene kontrole sličan je utilitarnoj prirodi filozofskog savjetovanja 
kao praktične djelatnosti. Kada se kontrola, koja podrazumijeva neku vrstu »nasilja«, sagleda u 
širokom razumijevanju pojma nasilje, otvara se prostor za diskusiju o izazovnom i kontroverznom 
pitanju o tome može li nasilje biti integrativno kako u smislu integracije vrijednosti, tako i u 
smislu potvrđivanja nečijeg socijalnog statusa nakon prijestupa, i to u mjeri većoj nego što su to 
institucionalizirane i od pojedinca relativno konceptualno udaljene vrste sankcija.
Ključne	riječi






Zur Verteidigung von integrativer Gewalt
Wie	philosophische	Praxis	die	organische	soziale	Kontrolle	steigern	kann
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel befasst sich mit dem Verhältnis zwischen organischen und institutionellen Formen 
der sozialen Kontrolle unter dem Gesichtspunkt des etwaigen Beitrags der philosophischen 
Praxis zur Deutung der sozialen Sanktionen. Die Argumentation geht von der empirischen 
Tatsache aus, dass die Gesetze und Verfassungen verschiedener Länder in ihren Präambeln 
den Zweck der Bestrafung zu allermeist in einem utilitaristischen Licht definieren. Dieser 
operativ-utilitäre Charakter der institutionellen sozialen Kontrolle ähnelt der utilitären Natur 
der philosophischen Beratung als praktische Tätigkeit. Wenn eine Kontrolle, die eine gewisse 
Art „Gewalt“ einbegreift, in einer ausgedehnten Auffassung des Begriffs der Gewalt besehen 
wird, wird ein Raum für die Diskussion der herausfordernden und kontroversen Frage darüber 
erschlossen,  ob  die  Gewalt  integrativ  sein  kann,  sowohl  im  Sinne  der  Werteintegration  als  
auch im Sinne der Bestätigung des sozialen Status eines Individuums nach einem bestimmten 
Vergehen, und zwar in einem größeren Ausmaß, als dies die institutionalisierten und vom 





Pour la défense de la violence intégrative
Comment la pratique philosophique peut-elle augmenter 
le contrôle social organique
Résumé
Ce travail aborde la relation entre les formes organiques et institutionnelles du contrôle social 
en  partant  du  point  de  vue  selon  lequel  la  pratique  philosophique  pourrait  contribuer  à  la  
compréhension  des  sanctions  sociales.  L’argumentation  prend  pour  point  de  départ  les  faits  
empiriques  sur  la  base  desquels  les  lois  et  les  constitutions  de  différents  pays,  dans  leurs  
préambules, définissent le plus souvent le but de la sanction à la lumière de l’utilitarisme. Ce 
caractère opérationnel et utilitariste du contrôle social institutionnel est semblable à la nature 
de  la  consultation  philosophique  en  tant  qu’activité  pratique.  Lorsque  le  contrôle,  qui  sous-
entend une sorte de « violence », est analysé par rapport à une large conception de la notion 
de violence, s’ouvre l’espace de la discussion qui aborde la question difficile et controversée de 
savoir si la violence peut être intégrative, autant au sens d’une intégration des valeurs, qu’au 
sens d’une confirmation d’un statut social suite à un acte répréhensible, et cela dans une plus 
large  mesure  que  sont  les  types  de  sanctions  institutionnalisées  et  relativement  éloignées  de  
l’individu d’un point de vue conceptuel.
Mots-clés
société	 organique,	 sanctions	 institutionnalisées,	 contrôle	 social,	 consultation	 philosophique,	
pratique	intégrative
